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Abstract—The Bitcoin network has offered a new way of
securely performing financial transactions over the insecure
network. Nevertheless, this ability comes with the cost of storing
a large (distributed) ledger, which has become unsuitable for
personal devices of any kind. Although the simplified payment
verification (SPV) clients can address this storage issue, a Bitcoin
SPV client has to rely on other Bitcoin nodes to obtain its
transaction history and the current approaches offer no privacy
guarantees to the SPV clients.
This work presents T 3, a trusted hardware-secured Bit-
coin full client that supports efficient and scalable oblivious
search/update for Bitcoin SPV clients without sacrificing the
privacy of the clients. In this design, we leverage the trusted
execution and attestation capabilities of a trusted execution
environment (TEE) and the ability to hide access patterns of
oblivious random access memory (ORAM) to protect SPV clients’
requests from a potentially malicious server. The key novelty of
T 3 lies in the optimizations introduced to conventional oblivious
random access memory (ORAM), tailored for expected SPV client
usages. In particular, by making a natural assumption about the
access patterns of SPV clients, we are able to propose a two-tree
ORAM construction that overcomes the concurrency limitation
associated with traditional ORAMs. We have implemented and
tested our system using the current Bitcoin Unspent Transaction
Output database. Our experiment shows that the system is highly
efficient in practice while providing strong privacy and security
guarantees to Bitcoin SPV clients.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, we have seen a great interest in
public blockchain in the community. The Bitcoin blockchain
offered a way to provide security and privacy for financial
transactions. However, due to the huge adoption by the com-
munity, the size of the Bitcoin blockchain has become too large
for small and resource-constrained devices such as personal
laptops or mobile phones, raising not only performance but
also privacy concerns in the community. As of October 2018,
the size of the unindexed Bitcoin blockchain is 230 GB.
To this end, Bitcoin’s simplified payment verification
(SPV) client has become a widely-adopted solution to resolve
a storage problem for constrained devices. Nakamoto [36]
sketched the idea of SPV clients in the Bitcoin whitepaper, and
in the Bitcoin improvement proposal 37 (BIP37) [34], Mike
Hearn combines Nakamoto’s idea with the use of Bloom filters
to standardize the design of Bitcoin SPV clients. This design
has become de facto standard and been used by other SPV
clients such as BitcoinJ [4] and Electrum [5].
The core of SPV clients is in only downloading and then
verifying part of the blockchain that is relevant to the SPV
client itself. In particular, the SPV client loads its addresses
into a Bloom filter and sends the filter to a Bitcoin full client,
and The Bitcoin full client will use that filter to identify if a
block contains transactions that are relevant to the SPV client,
and once it finds the block, it will send a modified block that
only contains relevant transactions along with Merkle proofs
for those transactions.
However, the current SPV solution relied on Bloom filters
raises security and privacy concerns to the SPV clients when
communicates with potentially malicious nodes. In particular,
Gervais et al. [25] show that it is possible for a malicious node
to learn several addresses of the client from the Bloom filter
with high probability. Moreover, if the adversarial node can
collect two filters issued by the same client, then a considerable
number of addresses owned by the client will be leaked.
To provide a strong privacy guarantee for SPV clients,
one needs a solution that can hide wallets/addresses queried
by the SPV clients. While such a system can be built using
private information retrieval (PIR) primitive, the existing cryp-
tographic PIR solutions [30] are not been practical to scale to
handle millions of Bitcoin users. On the other hand, to gain
more efficiency, one can use ORAM and trusted execution
environment to propose generic PIR systems [28], [23], [42].
However, as it becomes apparent in the later in this paper,
naively combining ORAM scheme as it is with TEE makes the
practicality of those generic systems questionable when used
in a large network like Bitcoin due to the lack of concurrency
in ORAM as well as the limitation of TEE with restricted
memory.
Our Contribution. This work aims not only to design a system
that provides SPV clients with privacy-preserving access to
the Bitcoin blockchain data but also to consider other practical
aspects on how to scale such a system to handle client requests
in a large-scale. Our contributions can be summarized as
follows:
Firstly, we present a novel design for a system that can
handle up to thousands of requests per minute from Bitcoin
SPV clients based on a restricted access Oblivious Random
Access Memory (ORAM) and the trusted execution capabil-
ities of TEE. In particular, one of the main contributions of
our design is the optimization access in the prominent tree-
based ORAM schemes that allow those ORAM schemes to
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support concurrent accesses which is essential for handling
SPV clients’ requests. In this design, the access privacy guar-
antee is still maintained because of our natural assumption
that the rational Bitcoin SPV clients should only query for
their particular transaction once before the arrival of a new
Bitcoin block. Nevertheless, we later show that even when
the SPV clients are irrational then the privacy for such clients
is only compromised for a short period of time. The security
guarantee of T 3 also relies on the trusted execution capabilities
of TEE that allows SPV clients to perform ORAM operations
securely and remotely. Our generic design works with other
blockchains, any tree-based ORAM schemes [43], [44], [49],
and any TEE with attestation capability.
Secondly, we implemented a prototype of T 3 and evaluated
its performance to demonstrate the practicality of our ap-
proach. More specifically, we extracted the unspent transaction
outputs set of Bitcoin in October 2018 and used it to measure
the performance of the system when handling clients’ requests.
The implementation of T 3 also adopts standard techniques
(i.e., oblivious operations using cmov [42], [10], [40]) to be
secure against known side-channel attacks [32], [31], [51].
Moreover, the use of recursive ORAM constructions in T 3
makes the system much more suitable for TEE with restricted
trusted memory like Intel SGX. We then show that the running
time of the ORAM read access decreases linearly with the
number of the threads used (e.g, up to 8× performance gained
with 4 threads).
Finally, we conclude that putting natural restrictions on the
access patterns on oblivious memory can lead to significant
performance improvement and better ORAM design. While
the applicability of T 3 in cryptocurrencies beyond Bitcoin
is apparent, we believe our work will also motivate further
research on oblivious memory with restricted access patterns.
Concurrent Work. The soon-to-be published BITE sys-
tem [9] also employs the Oblivious Database construction for
SPV client privacy. The main idea of the BITE construction
is to combine the use of non-recursive PATH-ORAM [44]
construction and TEE (such as Intel SGX) to propose a generic
system that offers SPV client with oblivious access to the
database. However, BITE did not address several shortcomings
of using PATH-ORAM as it is and TEE with restricted memory
in practice. In particular, the BITE design did not consider use
recursive ORAM constructions to reduce the trusted memory
usage; therefore, the efficiency of the system will be degraded
once the size of the database gets too large. Moreover, due to
the inherent lack of concurrency in tree-based ORAM such
as PATH-ORAM, naively using Path-ORAM makes BITE
unsuitable for handling thousands of Bitcoin client’s requests
per minute as well as thousands of updates every fixed period
of times (e.g., 10 minutes for Bitcoin). In this work, we inves-
tigate the use of both recursive PATH-ORAM and recursive
CIRCUIT-ORAM to understand the actual performance and
the actual storage overhead put on the server. Importantly,
we propose a two-tree ORAM design to further enhance the
performance of standard ORAM accesses as well as to allow
concurrent requests from the SPV client.
II. DESIGN GOALS AND SOLUTION OVERVIEW
In this section, we define the system components, outline
our security goals, and give an overview of how our system
works.
A. System Components
There are three key components of this system: the Bitcoin
network, a client, and a untrusted server. The Bitcoin network
is a set of nodes that maintains the Bitcoin blockchain, and the
network validates and relays the new Bitcoin block produced
by miners. A client is a Bitcoin simplified payment verification
node that remotely connects to the secure TEE on the untrusted
server to perform oblivious searches on the unspent transaction
output (UTXO) set. The client is also able to connect to the
Bitcoin Network to obtain other network metadata such as the
latest Bitcoin block header. A server is the untrusted entity
made up of two components: an untrusted server and several
trusted TEEs (i.e., the managing, reading, and writing TEEs).
Moreover, the untrusted server stores three encrypted databases
which are the read-once ORAM tree, the original ORAM tree,
and the Bitcoin header chain. The untrusted server hosts a
potentially malicious bitcoin client (e.g., bitcoind) that handles
the communication with the Bitcoin Network.
B. Design Goals
The goal of our system is to leverage the trusted execution
capabilities of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) with
attestation to design a public Bitcoin full node that supports
oblivious search and update on the current Bitcoin unspent
transaction output database. Our system aims to provide data
confidentiality and privacy to Bitcoin SPV clients in a large
scale by using standard encryption and Oblivious RAM tech-
niques on the current set of unspent transaction outputs. The
main goals that T 3 tries to achieve are:
1) Privacy. T 3 aims to provide privacy and confidentiality
to SPV clients’ requests. In particular, the system allows
SPV clients to obliviously search its relevant transactions
without revealing their addresses to potentially malicious
providers by using TEE to encrypt the data and using
ORAM schemes to eliminate known side channel leak-
ages [40], [10], [28], [42].
2) Validity. In our design, the SPV client should be able to
obtain valid information based on the provided addresses,
and a malicious adversary should not able to tamper the
Blockchain data with invalid transaction outputs.
3) Completeness. The system should provide clients with
access to most of its relevant transactions in order to
determine balance or to obtain essential information to
form new transactions.
4) Efficiency. The system should be practical to deploy.
More specifically, the system should be efficient enough
to handle different concurrent SPV clients’ requests with-
out compromising the privacy of the clients.
C. Solution Overview
The idea of using ORAM schemes and trusted execution
environment to construct database systems that support obliv-
ious accesses has been investigated by the research commu-
nity [28], [23], [42]. However, the efficiency and scalability
of those systems are hampered by the lack of concurrency of
traditional ORAM schemes [44], [49].
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Fig. 1: An overview of T 3 workflow. The encrypted ORAM databases are stored in server untrusted memory region. Steps 1 - 6
describe the flow of the request sent from SPV clients. Steps 1 - 8 describe the flow of the update procedure when T 3 receives
new Bitcoin block
In this work, we design T 3 to overcome the limitations
of efficiency and concurrency plaguing existing systems. Our
design is motivated by the following observations. The first
observation is that each ORAM access in a standard tree-
based ORAM settings is a combination of two operations: a
read-path operation and an eviction operation. By separating
the effects two operations into two different trees: a read-
once ORAM tree and an original ORAM tree, one can
use read-path operation on the read-once ORAM tree to
handle clients’ requests simultaneously while performing a
non-blocking eviction operation on the original ORAM tree
sequentially. This design is also independently investigated by
ConcurORAM [14]; however, their design is not suited for
TEEs with limited trusted memory (such as Intel SGX). We
elaborate on this in the coming sections.
The second observation is that the access privacy guar-
antee of this approach relies the characteristic of the Bitcoin
blockchain. In particular, the Bitcoin network generates new
Bitcoin block on average of 10 minutes, and if we require T 3
to periodically synchronize these the two trees, then the privacy
of clients’ queries are preserved. Moreover, if we assume
that upon receiving transactions belonged to its addresses, the
rational client should not query same transactions again until
the next block arrives, the proposed approach on the separation
of read-path and eviction procedure not only does not affect
the privacy guarantees of ORAM access but also allows T 3
to handle much more clients’ requests. More importantly, we
also argue that even when the SPV clients are irrational by
submitting requests for the same transaction more than one, the
privacy of those clients is only compromised for a short period
of time (i.e., 10 minutes for the Bitcoin network) because
T 3 will always synchronize the old instance of the read-once
ORAM tree with the more updated instance of the original
ORAM tree. With the intuition of T 3 described above, we
outline the workflow of our design:
Server Initialization 1 - 8 : Initially, the managing TEE will
initialize a writing TEE that creates an empty ORAM tree.
For each of Bitcoin block obtained from the network, the
managing TEE verifies the proof of work of the block before
passing relevant update data to the writing TEE in order to
populate the ORAM tree. With the current size of the Bitcoin
blockchain, this operation might take several hours. However,
once the TEEs catch up with the current state of the Bitcoin
blockchain, we expect that the TEE only has to perform a batch
of update accesses on the ORAM tree every 10 minute. When
the initialization is completed, the managing TEE creates two
copies of the ORAM tree which are the read-once ORAM tree
and the original ORAM tree.
Oblivious read-once Protocol 1 - 6 : In order to obtain its
unspent outputs, the client first performs the remote attestation
to the managing TEE. The remote attestation mechanism
allows the client to verify the correctness of program execution
inside the TEE. More importantly, after a successful attestation,
the client can use standard key exchange mechanism (i.e.
Diffie-Hellman’s key exchange) to share a secret session key
with the TEE in order to establish a secure connection with the
managing TEE. Upon receiving client’s connection requests,
the managing TEE creates a reading TEE with its own copies
of the ORAM position map and the ORAM stash to handle
client subsequent requests. Next, after having a secure channel,
the client will send his Bitcoin addresses along with the
proof of ownership of those addresses to the TEE (e.g., the
knowledge of the public key along with a signature to a random
nonce or the preimage of the public key hash). The reading
TEE will use a mapping function to map Bitcoin addresses into
the ORAM block identification number and performs read-
once ORAM access on the ORAM tree. In particular, those
read-once ORAM access do not involve the eviction procedure
which requires re-encrypting and remapping the ORAM block.
The eviction procedure will be performed on the original
ORAM tree by the writing TEE.
Oblivious Write Protocol 1 - 8 : The T 3 requires to update
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the ORAM tree via batch of write accesses every 10 minutes
on average. In particular, T 3 will rely on a standard Bitcoin
client to handle the communication with the Bitcoin network
to obtain blockchain data1. Thus, T 3 needs to verify the
block relayed by a potentially malicious Bitcoin client before
updating the ORAM tree. More specifically, in the design,
T 3 stores a separate Bitcoin header chain to verify the proof
of work and the validity of all transactions inside a Bitcoin
block. After the verification, the managing TEE forms a batch
of ORAM updates and delegates those updates to the writing
TEE. Once those updates are finished, the managing TEE will
queue up read requests from SPV clients in order to allow
the writing TEE to finish the eviction requests from the read
TEEs during the updating interval. As soon as the writing TEE
finishes performing those eviction requests, the managing TEE
updates the position map and stash, and makes the ORAM tree
used by the writing TEE become the new ORAM tree used by
reading TEE. At this point, the reading TEE can use the new
tree instance to respond to clients’ requests while the writing
TEE performs the eviction procedure on another copy of the
same ORAM tree.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND THREAT MODEL
A. Trusted Execution Environment
The design of T 3 relies on a trusted execution environment
(TEE) to prove the correctness of the computations. In particu-
lar, TEE is a trusted hardware that provides both confidentiality
and integrity of computations as well as offer an authentication
mechanism, known as attestation, for the client to verify com-
putation correctness. In this work, we chose Intel SGX [18]
to be the building block of our system. However, with minor
modifications, the design of our system can be extended to any
TEE with attestation capabilities such as Keystone-enclave [7]
and Sanctum [19] as other trusted execution environments
might not have the same strengths/weaknesses as Intel SGX.
Intel SGX is a set of hardware instructions introduced with
the 6th Generation Intel Core processors. We use Intel SGX
as a TEE for the execution of an ORAM controller on the
untrusted server. The relevant elements of SGX are as follows.
Enclave is the trusted execution unit that is located in a
dedicated portion of the physical RAM called the enclave page
cache (EPC). The SGX processor makes sure that all other
software components on the system cannot access the enclave
memory. Intel SGX supports both local and remote attes-
tation mechanisms to allow remote parties or local enclaves
to authenticate and verify if the program is correctly executed
within an SGX context. More importantly, attestation protocols
provide the authentication required for a key exchange protocol
[18], i.e., after a successful attestation, the concerned parties
can agree on a shared session key using Diffie-Hellman Key
Exchange [22] and create a secure channel.
Limitations. Intel SGX comes with various limitations which
have been uncovered by the academic community over the past
few years. In particular, some of the limitations are:
• Side Channel Attacks: While Intel SGX provides secu-
rity guarantees against direct memory attacks, it does not
provide systematic protection mechanisms against side
1This ability can be easily included in the future implentation of T 3.
channel attacks such as page table-based [51], [31], cache-
based [13], and branch-prediction-based [32]. Through
page table and cache attacks, a privileged attacker can
observe cache-line-granular (i.e., 64B) memory access
patterns from the enclave program. On the other hand,
the branch-prediction attack can potentially leak all the
control-flow taken by the enclave program.
• Enclave Page Cache Limit: The size of the Enclave Page
Cache (EPC) is limited to around 96MB [11]. Although
Intel SGX alleviates this limitation by supporting page-
swapping between trusted memory region and untrusted
memory region, this operation is expensive due to encryp-
tion and integrity verification [18], [11].
• System Calls: Intel SGX programs are restricted to ring-
3 privileges and therefore rely on the untrusted OS for
ring-0 operations such as file and network I/O. There are
various previous works which try to solve this problem
using library OSes [47] and/or other techniques [28].
Oblivious Operations inside the Enclave. Several tech-
niques [40], [28], [42], [37] have been introduced to mitigate
side-channel attacks on the SGX. In this work, we built our
system based on the implementations of both Zerotrace [42]
and Obliviate [10]. Therefore, our system inherited standard
secure operations from both of these libraries. In particular,
their implementations use an oblivious access wrapper by
using the x86 instruction cmov as introduced by Raccoon [40].
Using cmov, the wrapper accesses every single byte of a
memory object while reading or writing only the required bytes
in memory. From the perspective of an attacker (which can
only observe access-patterns), this is the same as reading or
modifying every byte in memory. We refer readers to [42],
[10], [40] for detailed description of these oblivious operations.
B. Oblivious Random Access Memory
Oblivious Random Access Memory (ORAM) was first
introduced by Goldreich et al [26] for software protection
against piracy. The core of ORAM is to hide the access patterns
resulted by reading and writing accesses on encrypted data.
The security of ORAM can be described as follows.
Definition 1: [44] Let
→
y= (opi, bidi, datai)i∈[n] denote
a sequence of accesses where opi ∈ {read,write}, bidi is
the identifier, and datai denotes the data being written. For
an ORAM scheme Σ, let AccessΣ(
→
y ) denote a sequence of
physical accesses pattern on encrypted data produced by
→
y .
We say: (a) The scheme Σ is secure if for any two sequences
of accesses
→
x and
→
y of the same length, AccessΣ(
→
x) and
AccessΣ(
→
y ) are computationally indistinguishable. (b) The
scheme Σ is correct if it returns on input
→
y data that is con-
sistent with
→
y with probability ≥ 1− negl(|→y |) i.e negligible
in |→y |
Tree-based ORAM schemes. One strategy of designing an
ORAM scheme is to follow the tree paradigm proposed by Shi
et al. [43] and Stefanov et al. [44]. In tree based ORAM, the
client encrypts their database into N different encrypted data
blocks and obliviously stores those data blocks in a binary tree
of height dlog2(N)e. Each node in the tree is called a bucket,
and each bucket can contain up to Z blocks. The client also
maintains a position map, to indicate which path a data block
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Algorithm 1 ORAM.Access(op, bid, data∗)
1: S ← ReadPath(bid) //scan the whole stash
2: data← block bid from S
3: if op = write then
4: S ← (S−{(bid, data)}) ∪ {(bid, data∗)}
5: end if
6: p′ $← {0, . . . , N−1} //the random eviction path is selected
7: S ← Evict(S, p′)
8: return data
Fig. 2: a standard tree-based ORAM read/write access
resides on. Finally, the client needs to have a stash to store a
path retrieved from the server.
We follow the same generalization of a tree-based ORAM
access described in [28]. Each access in both ORAM schemes
requires two operations: a ReadPath operation and an Evict
operation. Intuitively, ReadPath takes as input the ORAM
block identifier, bid, accesses the position map, and retrieves
the path that block bid resides onto the stash, S. After
performing ORAM access (i.e. read/write) on the identified
block, the block is assigned to a different path and pushed
back to the tree via the Evict operation. In general, the Evict
operation takes a stash and the assigned path as input, writes
back blocks from stash to the assigned path, and update the
position map. Figure 2 gives an overview of how tree-based
ORAM access works.
PATH-ORAM/CIRCUIT-ORAM scheme. In this work, we
consider two popular tree-based constructions of ORAM which
are PATH-ORAM [44] and CIRCUIT-ORAM [49]. While
PATH-ORAM offers simple ReadPath and Evict operations,
CIRCUIT-ORAM offers a smaller circuit complexity for the
Evict procedure. Thus, CIRCUIT-ORAM is more efficient
when implemented with Intel SGX. As noted in [42], [28],
[49], CIRCUIT-ORAM can operate with Z = 2 compared
to Z = 4 as in PATH-ORAM; therefore, the server storage
overhead is significantly reduced. Moreover, the size of stash
in CIRCUIT-ORAM is smaller compared to the size of stash in
PATH-ORAM; this allows a more efficient performance when
scanning the stash as one needs to scan the whole path and
stash to avoid side-channel leakage.
Recursive ORAM. In a non-recursive tree-based ORAM
setting, the client has to store a position map of the size O(N)
bits. This approach, however, is not suitable for a resource-
constrained client. Stefanov et. al [44] presented a technique
that reduces the size of the position map to O(1). The main
idea of those constructions is to store a position map as
another ORAM tree in the server side, and the client only
keeps the position map of the new ORAM. The client keeps
compressing the position map into another ORAM tree until
the size of the position map is small enough to be saved on
the client’s storage. One main drawback of those constructions
is the increased cost in the communication between a client
and the server. Fortunately, in our setting, this cost can be
safely ignored because the communication between client and
server becomes the I/O access between TEE and the random
access memory. Thus, it is more reasonable to use recursive
constructions because it reduces the memory stored in the
trusted region (e.g., Processor Reserved Memory).
C. Blockchain
The Bitcoin blockchain is a distributed data structure
maintained by a group of nodes. In this work, to simplify the
structure of the Bitcoin blockchain, we denote the network as
a single party that maintains a growing database of Bitcoin
blocks. On average of 10 minutes, the network outputs a
Bitcoin block which is a combination of Bitcoin transactions
and a block header. Each block header contains relevant
information about the Bitcoin block such as Merkle root,
nonce, network difficulty. The Merkle root can be used to
verify the membership of Bitcoin transactions, and the nonce
and difficulty are used to check the proof of work. Each
Bitcoin transaction contains a set of inputs and outputs where
transaction inputs are unused outputs of previous transactions.
• Unspent Transaction Output Database. In the Bitcoin
network, the balance of a Bitcoin address is determined by
values of those outputs that have not been used in other
transactions. These outputs are called Unspent Transaction
Outputs (UTXO). Moreover, in the implementation of common
Bitcoin nodes such as Bitcoin core [1], Bitcoin nodes maintain
a separate database that keeps track of all unspent transaction
outputs and other metadata of the Bitcoin blockchain. This
database is known as the UTXO set. Intuitively, a client with
the knowledge of the secret key and the commitment value can
query the UTXO set directly to obtain essential information
such as transaction hash, position, and value to form new
valid transactions. Therefore, in this work, we realize that if
a full node can securely update and maintain the integrity of
the UTXO set via while provides SPV clients with oblivious
accesses to the UTXO set, the privacy of the SPV client is
preserved.
• Bitcoin transaction types. In the Bitcoin blockchain,
transactions are classified based on the structure of the input
and output scripts. In particular, there are five types of standard
script templates which are Pay-to-Pubkey (P2PK), Pay-to-
PubkeyHash (P2PKH), Pay-to-ScriptHash (P2SH), Multisig,
and Nulldata. Intuitively, scripting in Bitcoin provides a way
to prove the ownership of the coins. In particular, a challenge
script (scriptPubkey) is included as a part of the transaction
output to specify the condition for its redemption, and a
response script (scriptSig) is part of the transaction input to
reveal the condition needed to redeem the bitcoins from other
output.
In this work, we only consider two types of transaction: Pay-
to-PubkeyHash (P2PKH) transaction and Pay-to-ScriptHash
(P2SH) transaction. According to [21], [35], these two types of
transaction make up of 97-99% of the UTXO set. Also, one can
assume that the Pay-to-Pubkey-Hash transaction is one variant
of the Pay-to-Script-Hash transaction because both transaction
types require the spender’s knowledge of the preimage of
the hash digest before being able to spend those outputs.
For simplicity, from this point on, we assume that the only
information needed to obtain the unspent output is the public
key hash, pkh. Moreover, all other transaction types such as
Multisig and P2PK can be easily supported in the future.
• Block creation interval. The block creation time in
Bitcoin is the time that the network takes to generate a new
block, and block creation time is specified to be 10 minutes on
average by the network. We call the waiting period between
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the most recent block and a new block, block creation interval.
In this work, we discretize time as block creation intervals.
D. Threat Model
We assume that SPV clients are honest and rational which
means that before during the block creation interval, a SPV
client should not request the server for transaction outputs of a
same public key hash more than once. The underlying remote
attestation service provided by Intel is secure and trusted. The
local attestation between enclaves is secure. The server and
its programs are assumed to be untrusted except for programs
running within an enclave.
We assume that the adversary who controls the operating
system can read/inject/modify encrypted messages sent by en-
claves. The adversary also can observe memory access patterns
of both trusted and untrusted memory. Also, the computation
power of the adversary is assumed to be limited. In particular,
during block creation interval, the adversary should not have
enough computation power to forge a new Bitcoin block that
satisfies the current Bitcoin network difficulty. As the time of
writing, the network difficulty [3] is around 6×109; therefore,
the expected number of hashes to mine a Bitcoin block is
roughly 272.
The server’s attacks on availability are out of scope. More
specifically, denial of service (DoS) attacks by system admin
and untrusted operating system are out of the scope. Otherwise,
such adversary can prevent the enclaves from receiving new
bitcoin block by shutting down the communication channel
between the enclave and the Bitcoin network as the enclave
has to rely on the untrusted OS to perform system calls such
as file and network I/O.
IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM
In this section, we first describe how T 3 stores the UTXO
set by exploring different mappings between the unspent
transaction outputs and the ORAM blocks. We see that naive
mapping may not be secure for blockchain applications as it
may lead to denial of services attacks. Next, we demonstrate
how Intel SGX can be considered as a trusted execution unit
to access ORAM and perform read/write operations in an
oblivious manner. Finally, we will describe how the system
handles clients’ requests during a write operation.
A. Storage Structure of the UTXO set
In the first step, we show how to map the public key hash
to ORAM block identification and then describe the storage
requirements in T 3.
1) Bitcoin unspent transaction output mapping: In the
design of T 3, we assume that the SPV clients only know
his/her addresses (i.e., the public key hashes); therefore, to
return the outputs belonging to the client’s address, the enclave
needs to know the mapping between the address and the
ORAM block identification.
In this work, we propose two simple mappings to store
unspent outputs in the ORAM tree. More specifically, both
approaches use standard cryptographic hash functions along
with a secret key generated by the enclave. The first approach
is to map a single Bitcoin address into a single ORAM block,
and the second approach is to map a Bitcoin address into
multiple ORAM blocks. We will later explain the trade-off
between these two approaches. Intuitively, the first approach
is more efficient in terms of performance and can be more
expensive in terms of storage overhead. The second approach
gives some flexibility in terms of storage overhead; however,
to offer strong privacy to every address, this approach can be
more expensive in terms of performance because it may incur
more ORAM calls.
Single address into Single ORAM block. In this design,
during the initialization, we require the program inside the
enclave to use a keyed hash function to map the public key
hash to ORAM block identification. The secret key of the hash
function is generated and known only by the enclave. In other
words, the mapping between a Bitcoin address to an ORAM
block identification is known only to the SGX. We define the
mapping as follow:
• bid ← OBlockMap(pkh, kb): the function takes as input
a 20-bytes hash digest pkh and a secret key kb, it outputs
the block identification number bid ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}.
The key-hashing approach offers some flexibility when de-
ciding the size of an ORAM blocks and the size of height of the
ORAM tree. These two factors affect the size of the position
map (resp. number of recursive levels) for non-recursive (resp.
recursive) ORAM constructions. However, since the output
domain of OBlockMap(·, ·) is limited to the size of the ORAM
blocks, there will exist collisions. The following claim gives
us a loose upper bound on the number of addresses that should
be stored inside an ORAM block.
Claim 1: (Addresses per ORAM block) Let m be the
number of public key hashes, N be the number of ORAM
blocks. If the OBlockMap() acts as a truly random function,
then the maximum number of addresses in each ORAM block
is smaller than e ·m/N with a probability 1− 1/N .
Proof: This is a standard max-load analysis. We refer
readers to [20] for detailed analysis. We note that there exists
a tighter bound, but we use e ·m/N bounds to simplify the
equation.
Thus, if we limit each ORAM block to contain the outputs
of at most e ·m/N addresses, then the probability that every
address is included is at least 1 − 1/N . Figure 3 gives us a
high level overview of this approach.
Enclave
pkh
kb
OBlockMap() ORAM bid
Fig. 3: Single address into Single ORAM block
Single address into Many ORAM blocks. Mapping a single
address into a single ORAM block incurs less work on the
server as it requires a single ORAM access for an address.
However, if we want to allow each address to have more than
one output, using the first approach implies that the storage
overhead increase linearly because the first approach distribute
unspent outputs based on its addresses. Therefore, we have to
pad dummy data for those addresses that contain 1 outputs.
Thus, we need a different mapping without linear increasing
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in storage overhead. To fix this shortcoming, the system needs
to assign unspent outputs into ORAM block uniformly. One
method is to allow a client to specify the number of ORAM
accesses to obtain all of its unspent outputs as long as the
number of requests does not exceed certain threshold. We
define the mapping as follows:
• {bidi}i∈{0,...,δ−1} ← OBlockMap(pkh, kb, δ): the func-
tion takes as input a 20-bytes hash digest pkh, a secret
key kb, and a number δ where the maximum value of δ
is specified by the system. It outputs a set of block iden-
tification numbers {bidi}i∈{0,...,δ−1} ⊆ {0, . . . , N − 1}.
This approach also introduces some leakage as some addresses
may contain more unspent outputs than others. Alternatively,
the system can fix the value of δ ORAM accesses for all
addresses with the expense of performance (i.e., one address
incurs constant ORAM accesses). Similarly, the storage over-
head of T 3 can be computed using the following claim:
Claim 2: (UTXO per ORAM block) Let m be the number
of unspent outputs, N be the number of ORAM blocks. If
the OBlockMap acts as a truly random function, then the
maximum number of outputs in each ORAM block is smaller
than e ·m/N with probability at least 1− 1/N
The proof is identical to proof of claim 1.
Figure 4 offers an overview of the both approaches.
Enclave
pkh
kb
OBlockMap()
ORAM bid
δ = 2 ORAM bid
pkh
Enclave
kb
OBlockMap()
ORAM bid
ORAM bid
δ = 2max = 3
Fig. 4: Single Address into Many ORAM blocks
2) Storage: In this system, we require the untrusted server
to store three separate databases which are the read-once
ORAM tree, the original ORAM tree, and the blockheader
chain. In particular, Read-Once ORAM Tree serves as a
dedicated storage to handle clients’ requests. The structure
of the tree is identical to the standard ORAM tree Original
ORAM Tree is where all standard ORAM eviction operations
are performed. In this work, we also require the enclave to
maintain the Bitcoin Header Chain to verify the proof of
work of the bitcoin block sent by other bitcoin client. The
header chain is stored in the untrusted memory with integrity
check.
B. Oblivious Read and Write Protocols
In T 3, the SPV client is the party who invokes read
accesses, and the Bitcoin network is the party who invokes
write accesses. The TEE in the server is the one that performs
both of those accesses on behalf of the client and the Bitcoin
network.
1) Server System Components: Before explaining how
oblivious read and write accesses work, we first start out-
lining the different components of our design. The server is
initialized with different enclaves: Managing Enclave Em
coordinates other enclaves and to handle requests from the
clients. The managing enclave also handles the communication
with other Bitcoin client or local Bitcoin client (bitcoind) via
Read-once	ORAM Original	ORAM
R-Enclave R-Enclave W-Enclave
Evict	Queue
SPV
Clients
1
2
3
5
6
Managing	Enclave
Secure	Channel
#Read	Steps
4
Fig. 5: The read protocol. Steps 1 - 5 describes how T 3
receives and responds to the client, and for each request, the
writing enclave performs the Eviction procedure of ORAM on
the original ORAM tree during step 6 .
request procedure calls (RPC) to obtain Bitcoin blocks. Upon
receiving the Bitcoin block, the managing enclave also verifies
the integrity of the block using a separated header chain.
Reading Enclave Er is a dedicated enclave initialized by
the managing enclave. It has a copy of ORAM position map
and its own stash. The reading enclave operates on the read-
once ORAM tree. Also, the reading enclave only performs
ORAM ReadPath operations to obtain data while ORAM
Eviction operations will be handled by the writing enclave.
Writing Enclave Ew performs Eviction procedure for each
read request, and performs ORAM writing accesses when a
new Bitcoin block arrives from the Bitcoin network.
2) Oblivious read-once Protocol: Here, we describe how a
remote client can perform a read access on the UTXO set.
Notation. First, let’s denote Kb to be the block mapping key,
bid to be the ORAM block identification. We let (Enc,Dec)
denote an authenticated encryption scheme. We assume that the
the server has already been initialized with a writing enclave,
Ew and a managing enclave, Em. The managing enclave has
a similar copy of the position map as the map in the writing
enclave. Figure 5 presents the oblivious read protocol of T 3.
The oblivious read protocol can be described as follows:
1) The client establishes a secure channel with the
managing enclave 1 : First, the client performs a remote attes-
tation with the secure managing enclave, Em, and agrees on a
session key, Ks. The client encrypts his address along with the
proof of ownership of that address, and sends the encrypted
query to the server to be passed to Em. For simplicity, we
assume that the plaintext only contains a public key hash, pkh,
that the client is interested in, and the proof of ownership of the
pkh is φ, C ← EncKs(pkh, φ). Note that there are different
ways to prove the ownership of public key hash/addresses. In
Bitcoin, if the public key is never revealed before, the proof
of ownership can simply be the public key (i.e. φ = pk such
that H(pk) = pkh). Alternatively, the system can enforce a
client to provide the signature and the public key to prove the
ownership of the public key hash.
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2) The managing enclave initializes a reading en-
clave 2 : after receiving a client’s request, Em initializes
a dedicated reading enclave, Er to handle the client’s future
requests. Also, we require that the enclaves authenticate each
other, and the existence of a secure channel between enclaves.
Moreover, the reading enclave has its copy of the position
map, its own stash, the block mapping key Kb, and the agreed
session key Ks.
3) The managing enclave identifies and forwards
ORAM Block ID to both reading and writing en-
claves 2 : After decrypting the ciphertext (pkh, φ) ←
DecKs(C), Em verifies the proof φ and pkh, then uses
OBlockMap(·, ·) 2 function to learn the ORAM block ID,
bid ← OBlockMap(pkh,Kb) where Kb is the secret key
generated by the enclave during initialization for mapping
purposes. After obtaining the ORAM id, bid, the managing
enclave forwards bid to the writing enclave for the eviction
procedure, and forwards the (pkh, bid) to the reading enclave.
4) The reading enclave performs read-once ORAM
access on the read-once ORAM tree 3 : Based on the given
bid, the reading enclave performs ORAM read only accesses
on the ORAM tree to obtain the block. If the block contains
the unspent output that belongs to the public key pkh, the
reading enclave adds outputs into the response R. To mitigate
the size leakage, the response R is padded with dummy data
if there is no UTXO found.
5) The reading enclave responds to the Client 4 - 5 :
The enclave encrypts the response, R, using the session key
Ks then sends it to the client.
6) The writing enclave performs the eviction procedure
on the original ORAM tree 6 : After obtaining the bid
from the managing enclave, the update enclave will perform
a standard ORAM read accesses on the original ORAM tree.
The goal of this procedure is to use the Eviction procedure
inside standard ORAM operation to rerandomize the location
of the actual block. No actual data is return in this step.
3) Oblivious Write Protocol: In the Bitcoin network, min-
ers generate a new Bitcoin block on average every 10 minutes.
When the server receives a new block from the Bitcoin
network, the managing enclave can obtain it from the bitcoin
client. The Em verifies the integrity of the block by computing
the Merkle root from transactions, then verifying the proof of
work, and the writing enclave has to perform an update on the
original ORAM tree; however, in the mean time, the system
should be able to handle clients’ requests during updates. We
will explain how T 3 handles oblivious write accesses while
handling clients’ requests as follow:
1) The managing enclave verifies a new Bitcoin
block 1 - 3 : Once a bitcoin block arrives to the system
from the Bitcoin network, the managing enclave Em can
obtain it from the Bitcoin client. However, since the client
runs outside the enclave, the enclave needs to verify the
integrity of the new block by computing the Merkle root and
verifying the proof of work to make sure that the block has
not been tampered by the untrusted OS. For the detail of these
computations, we refer readers to [2]. Moreover, as discussed
2for simplicity, we assume that the one-to-one mapping is used here
Read-once	ORAM	 Original	ORAM
R-Enclave R-Enclave W-Enclave
6
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Header	DatabaseWrite	Queue
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Fig. 6: Oblivious write protocol. During steps 1 - 5 , the
managing enclave receives and responds to SPV client request
as usual. During steps 6 - 8 , read requests from clients are
queued up, and the managing enclave resume these requests
after updating the read-once ORAM tree
in section IV-A, to verify a newly arrived block, the system is
required to keep a separate block headers chain with integrity
check in the untrusted memory. Once Em verifies the bitcoin
block, Em starts pruning the transactions to obtain relevant
information of the transactions’ inputs and outputs. Then, Em
uses OBlockMap(·, ·) to find the ORAM block identification to
queue up ORAM write requests to the writing enclave. During
this process, the oblivious read protocol performs as normal
on the read-once ORAM tree.
2) The managing enclave sends write requests to the
writing enclave 4 : Once the pruning process completes, the
Em starts sending write requests based on data extracted from
the bitcoin block to the writing enclave, Ew. On otherhand, for
each eviction request resulted from SPV client’s requests, Em
starts queuing up those eviction requests.
3) The writing enclave performs write accesses on the
original ORAM tree 4 - 5 : Upon receiving writing requests
from Em, the Ew performs all writing requests in the writing
queue on the original ORAM tree.
4) The writing enclave finishes all eviction requests
queued up on the original ORAM tree 6 - 7 : Once finished
updating the tree, the Ew signals Em to start queuing up clients’
requests and performs all eviction requests incurred by SPV
clients’ read requests during update interval. Finally, when it
finishes, it signals the Em to update the read-once ORAM tree
and make a copy of the position map.
5) The managing enclave performs an update the read-
once ORAM tree and the original ORAM tree and enclave
metadata 8 : In particular, Em discards the current copy of
the read-once ORAM tree, and makes 2 identical copies of
the most updated original ORAM tree. One is used as read-
once ORAM tree, and the other is used as original ORAM
tree. Also, the new position map and new stash are updated
for the managing enclave. Once this process is finished, Em
starts answering SPV clients’ requests again.
Figure 6 gives us an overview of the oblivious write protocol.
Discussion The core idea of the oblivious update protocol is
to minimize the downtime of T 3 during the update process.
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More specifically, during step 1 - 5 , T 3 still allows SPV
clients to query the system while from step 6 - 8 , T 3 stops
accepting clients’ requests in order to synchronize both trees.
This approach introduces some delay; however, the system
downtime is minimized to the same amount of time it takes
for the writing enclave to finish all eviction requests.
V. EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
In this section, we describe our configuration, our experi-
mental results, and the storage overhead of the system based
on the analysis of the UTXO set on the Bitcoin blockchain.
Moreover, we give a comparison between T 3 and the current
existing SPV solution in term of performance and commu-
nication overhead. Finally, we address the capabilities of T 3
compared to other related works.
A. Configuration
Software. We implemented our system with C++ using Intel
SGX SDK v2.0. The implementation of the ORAM controller
is built on top the Zerotrace [42] implementation. In order
to handle the communication with the Bitcoin network, we
have used libjson-rpc-cpp [6] framework to build C++
wrapper functions to communicate with the Bitcoin daemon
(bitcoind [1]) from inside the enclave through JSON-
RPC calls. For extracting the UTXO database, we used the
bitcoin-tool implementation proposed in [21]. This al-
lows us to save time during the initialization phase. Finally, we
used python-bitcoinlib [8] to compare the performance
of T 3 with the current existing SPV solution.
Database. To reduce the time of initializing both ORAM
trees from the genesis block, we used bitcoin-tool im-
plementation proposed in [21] to extract 3.2GB of the Bitcoin
UTXO set in February 2019.
We have downloaded a snapshot of the Bitcoin blockchain
including block 0 to 551, 731, containing a total of 58, 156, 895
Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXO). Figure 7 shows the
distribution of the unspent transaction outputs per address. We
see that more than 90% of the addresses have less than three
UTXOs. In our prototype, we considered at most two UTXOs
per wallet ID. This results in covering more than 92% of all
the UTXOs per wallet ID. Also, as discussed in section IV,
by using different mapping, one can cover more percentage of
Bitcoin addresses.
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Fig. 7: Number of transactions per wallet ID. By allowing each
address can have up to 2 UTXO, T 3 can cover approximate
92% of the UTXO set.
Hardware. We evaluated the performance of T 3 on a desktop
which is equipped with Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4116 CPU @
2.10GHz, 128GB RAM. Since Intel(R) Xeon(R) silver 4116 is
not SGX-enabled CPU, we obtain the performance results by
running our implementation in the simulation mode. However,
we expect to not have much of a performance difference when
executing in the two different modes. More specifically, we
have tested the performance of T 3 using a smaller ORAM
tree in the hardware mode on a commodity desktop equipped
with SGX-enabled Intel Core i7. Comparing the hardware and
simulation mode results (i.e., simulation on the Intel Core i7
CPU), we see no noticeable difference in the running time of
both read-once and standard ORAM accesses.
B. Experimental Results
We have implemented T 3 using multiple threads. As re-
ported in [27], [45], as long as the total amount of memory
used by all threads does not exceed the EPC limit, the perfor-
mance gain should be similar to the use of different enclaves.
In this work, we implemented all functionalities in one single
enclave, and we used multiple threads to concurrently accesses
the ORAM trees.
System parameters We tested our system with both recursive
PATH-ORAM and recursive CIRCUIT-ORAM using different
tree size N = 220, 221, 222, 223, 224. We allow each Bitcoin
address to have up to 2 unspent transaction outputs, and we use
the single address into single ORAM block mapping approach
described in section IV-A to map addresses into ORAM block.
Finally, we use claim 1 to determine the size of each ORAM
block.
Performance of read-once and standard ORAM accesses.
In T 3, the reading enclave performs read-once accesses
to handle client’s requests in an efficient manner. Table I
presents an overall performance of a standard ORAM access
as well as the performance of a read-once access for both
CIRCUIT-ORAM and PATH-ORAM. For this experiment, we
took the average running time of 10000 accesses.
As shown in the results, ORAM constructions with smaller
block sizes provides a better performance in both schemes. The
reason is that oblivious operations like oblivious comparisons
and cmov-based stash scan are more efficient because of a
smaller size stash. Moreover, CIRCUIT-ORAM gives a better
performance compared to PATH-ORAM, as it can operate on
a smaller block compared to PATH-ORAM, and this requires
much smaller stash size allowing much faster oblivious exe-
cution.
Parallelization. Since there is no race condition in the read-
once accesses, the design of T 3 allows different threads to con-
currently perform read-once accesses on the read-once ORAM
tree. Compared to other oblivious system like BITE [42], T 3 is
able to handle bursty client read requests concurrently while
the eviction requests are distributed sequentially during the
block creation interval. To measure this performance gain, we
used multiple threads to access the read-once enclave and
perform read-once access simultaneously on a tree of size
N = 224 and ORAM block of size 544 bytes. Table II shows
the performance of T 3 implemented using multiple threads for
both CIRCUIT-ORAM and PATH-ORAM.
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T 3 (PATH-ORAM, Z = 4) T 3 (CIRCUIT-ORAM, Z = 2)
N Block Size read-once Access Standard ORAM access read-once Access Standard ORAM access
220 6528 bytes (96 utxos) 16.34 ms 30.40 ms 2.13 ms 6.45 ms
221 3264 bytes (48 utxos) 9.24 ms 16.58 ms 1.27 ms 3.76 ms
222 2176 bytes (32 utxos) 7.56 ms 12.42 ms 1.05 ms 2.92 ms
223 1088 bytes (16 utxos) 4.12 ms 7.78 ms 0.72 ms 2.09 ms
224 544 bytes (8 utxos) 2.43 ms 5.89 ms 0.64 ms 1.70 ms
TABLE I: Performance of two different types of PATH/CIRCUIT-ORAM accesses on different block size.
Comparison to current SPV solutions. We give a com-
parison in term of performance and communication overhead
over several number of requests to the existing SPV client’s
solution and to BITE [9] Oblivious database.
1) Performance: Figure 8 gives us an overview of the
performance of T 3 compared to the performance of the current
existing SPV with Bloom filter solution and the performance of
Bite Oblivious database. In particular, it shows the response
latency from the client’s perspective. In this comparison, a
request for the SPV solution with Bloom filter solution means
the time the server takes to scan one Bitcoin block, and a
request for T 3 and BITE means the time it takes to perform an
ORAM access on the ORAM tree. For the current SPV clients
with Bloom filter, we set the false positive rate of the Bloom
filter to 1.0% and 5.0% respectively. For T 3, we used N = 224
and block of size 544 bytes for both PATH-ORAM with Z = 4
and CIRCUIT-ORAM with Z = 2. For BITE database, based
on our understand of their construction, we re-implemented
BITE using non-recursive construction of PATH-ORAM, and
we used the same ORAM block of size 32kB which leads
to the number of block is N = 217. Also, we also provide
an additional construction of BITE which is implemented
using recursive PATH-ORAM and suggested parameters for
T 3 where the tree is of size 224 and block of size 544B.
Figure 8 gives us the overall performance of three existing
solutions.
The performance of T 3 outperforms the SPV with Bloom filter
solution. The reason is that in T 3, the system relies on the TEE
to handle the integrity checking of the Bitcoin block before
updating the ORAM tree while in the current SPV solution,
the full client needs to scan the Bloom filter every time and
detect the relevant transactions and recompute the Merkle path
for each of those transactions.
Also, T 3 performs much better than BITE oblivious database
as the BITE system does not consider the use of recursive
ORAM construction. Another reason is that the size of the
ORAM block used in Bite is large; hence, the cost of oblivious
operation like cmov-based stash scan becomes more expen-
sive. Thus, we envision and realize an improved construction
of BITE using recursive construction of PATH-ORAM to
demonstrate the practical impact of using recursive ORAM
T 3 (PATH-ORAM) T 3 (CIRCUIT-ORAM)Number of threads
1 2.43 ms 0.64 ms
2 1.40 ms 0.58 ms
3 0.90 ms 0.43 ms
4 0.73 ms 0.35 ms
TABLE II: Performance gain of multiple-thread read-once
access on Path/CIRCUIT-ORAM with N = 224 block size
= 544 bytes.
construction on TEE with restricted memories.
2) Communication Overhead: In term of communication
between client and server, T 3 offers much lower communi-
cation overhead compared to the existing solution for SPV
clients. T 3 does not need to provide the SPV clients with the
Merkle proofs to its relevant transactions because all those
proofs are validated by the Intel SGX before being added
the ORAM tree. Thus, one can reduce both the amount of
work that the full node needs to perform and the amount of
data that it needs to send to the SPV clients. Moreover, T 3
prunes all other information of transactions to extract only
relevant data needed for client to determine balance and form
new transactions, while in the current SPV solution, due to
the false positive rate used in the Bloom filter, the full client
may send additional irrelevant information to the SPV client.
Figure 9 shows an overview of the communication cost of T 3
compared to the current solution. To give an estimation of the
communication cost of the current SPV solution, we assumed
that each request requires a separate Merkle proof. Hence, for
each request, the size of the proof is at least: log2(NoTXs) ·32
bytes where NoTXs is the number of transactions in one block.
Moreover, the size of the transaction data is approximately
fpr·BlockSize bytes where the fpr is the false positive rate and
the BlockSize is the size of the Bitcoin block. To compute the
overhead cost we used block 551731, as an example, which
has block size of 1149 KB and contains 3017 transactions.
However, in practice, we would expect the Bitcoin blocks to
have different sizes; resulting, the communication cost to be
different across blocks. Therefore, the results in fig. 9 is only
an estimation on the communication overhead using the current
SPV solution. We omit the comparison to the communication
overhead of BITE because both T 3 and BITE return a fixed
amount a data to the SPV client which is the output itself.
Storage Overhead As noted in the previous section, using
ORAM incurs a constant size blow up of the storage of the
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Fig. 9: Communication cost of T 3 and the current SPV
solution. Since both systems return the information of unspent
outputs to the client, the communication overhead of BITE
will be equal to the communication overhead of T 3.
UTXOs (e.g., ≈ 3 − 4× for CIRCUIT-ORAM, 6 − 8× for
PATH-ORAM). In particular, for PATH-ORAM with Z = 4,
the storage cost of ORAM trees is about ≈ 51GB, and for
CIRCUIT-ORAM with Z = 2, the storage cost of two ORAM
tree is around ≈ 26GB. For the EPC memory usage, we need
to consider the size of the position map and the stash used
by each enclave. In this work, since we use recursive ORAM
constructions for both schemes, the size of the position map
can be as small as possible at the cost of storing more recursive
ORAM trees in the untrusted memory region. Precisely, in the
prototype of our implementation, each thread uses 8KB for the
position map and a stash of size 2 · log(N) ·Z ·BlockSize bytes
(e.g., for a tree of size N = 224, we use ≈ 0.62MB bytes
for PATH-ORAM, and ≈ 0.31 MB for CIRCUIT-ORAM).
Thus, as long as the total memory usage by all threads/enclaves
does not exceed the EPC limit (e.g., 96MB), the performance
of the system will not suffer from the expensive swapping
operations discussed in section III-A. Moreover, for integrity
protection, T 3 only requires the server to store the Bitcoin
header chain which is approximately 44MB instead of storing
a complete Bitcoin blockchain. Thus, in the future work, if
T 3 can handle the communication with the Bitcoin network
without the reliance on the existing Bitcoin client, T 3 reduces
the need of storing the 230 GB of Bitcoin blockchain.
C. Comparison with Other Oblivious Systems
Here we provide a comparison between T 3 and other
generic oblivious systems. We compare our work with
BITE [9] Oblivious Database that also uses ORAM and
TEE to provide a generic PIR system for Bitcoin client,
CONCURORAM [14] that provides concurrency access to
ORAM clients, OBLIVIATE [10] that prevents leakage from file
system accesses, and ZEROTRACE which proposes an efficient
generic oblivious memory access primitives. In particular,
section V-C compares those systems based on the capabilities
of supporting concurrency access, enabling recursive construc-
tion, and preventing side-channel leakage.
For generic trusted hardware-based systems like BITE
oblivious database and OBLIVIATE, while providing protection
against side-channel leakage, those systems do not consider
the use of recursive ORAM construction to reduce the EPC
memory usage. Hence, the performance of their systems will
degrade once the database becomes too large. Other works that
harnesses the use of recursive ORAM construction are ZERO-
TRACE; however, concurrency is not supported in the current
version of ZEROTRACE. Thus, without concurrency support,
such systems will not scale well to handle Bitcoin SPV
clients. CONCURORAM is a recent ORAM construction that
offers concurrency accesses from the clients; however, due to
more optimized eviction strategy and complex synchronization
schedule, the recursive construction of CONCURORAM intro-
duces implementation challenges. Nevertheless, we believe that
it can be an interesting future work to use CONCURORAM in
the design of T 3.
VI. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
A. Security Claims
In order to prove the security properties of T 3’s design, we
put forth six claims, each of which represents the security of
a major component of T 3 in term of privacy goal.
Claim 1. The managing enclave does not leak user-related
information to an attacker. The managing enclave is respon-
sible for three tasks — (a) converting wallet IDs to UTXOs,
(b) creating and managing threads which will perform read
operations on the read-once ORAM tree, and (c) handle the
updates to be performed on the original ORAM tree.
Firstly, the conversion of wallet IDs to their respective
UTXOs is private since the channel between clients and the
managing enclave is secured by the shared key during the re-
mote attestation process. More importantly, when receiving ad-
dresses from a client, the managing enclave uses blockmapping
function (described in IV-A1) to map each address to a fixed
number of ORAM blocks. This does not reveal information
about the number of outputs belonging to an address. Secondly,
each read thread performs the same operations irrespective of
the wallet ID provided to it, i.e., each thread simply retrieves an
ORAM block using ORAM accesses implemented with cmov-
based oblivious executions. Lastly, the only thing revealed by
the update process of T 3 is the number of blocks updated into
the Write Tree. However, this is public information and T 3
does not try to hide it. Each update is performed using an
ORAM access which ensures that the attacker is unaware of
the final position of each block.
Claim 2. The optimized read operations on read-once
ORAM tree do not leak information. As explained in
section IV-B2, the read-once ORAM tree is accessed using
an optimized read operation which chooses not to shuffle and
write-back the retrieved path to the read-once ORAM tree.
However, this is secure since each path corresponding to a
UTXO can only be accessed once during a read interval and
will be shuffled before the next interval.
Claim 3. The write operations performed on the original
ORAM tree do not leak information. There are two specific
Capabilities
System Concurrency Recursive Construction Side-channel Protection
CONCURORAM [14] 3 7 - a
OBLIVIATE [10] 7 7 3
ZEROTRACE [42] 7 3 3
BITE Oblivious Database [9] 7 7 3
T 3 3 3 3
aCONCURORAM does not aim to provide side-channel protection for TEE.
Hence, we omit this comparison.
TABLE III: Comparison between T 3 and other oblivious
systems.
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operations performed on the original ORAM tree— (a) the
UTXOs are updated based on the updated bitcoin block,
and (b) the previously accessed ORAM blocks are shuffled.
However, all of these updating accesses are standard ORAM
operations implemented in a side-channel-resistant manners as
previously done by [42], [10]. Therefore, all write operations
reveal no information about a user’s UTXO.
Claim 4. The data fetched from the untrusted world to
the TEE is correct. There are two major sources of data
transferred from the untrusted to the trusted world — (a) the
updated block fetched from the bitcoin daemon after a fixed
interval and (b) the ORAM tree blocks which are fetched from
the untrusted world into the TEE. As mentioned in IV-B3,
Bitcoin blocks are fetched from outside the enclave. However,
T 3 verifies the integrity of the Bitcoin block based on the
proof of work and the header chain, and since the cost of
producing a valid block is expensive, we argue that T 3 should
be able to obtain valid block from the Bitcoin network. Also,
T 3 maintains a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) of the ORAM trees
and therefore prevents malicious tampering by verifying all
encrypted data fetched from the untrusted memory using the
MHT. All encrypted data fetched from the untrusted memory
is verified using the MHT.
Claim 5. The multiple threads involved do not create
synchronization issues. Here, it is worth-noting that multiple
threads are only involved while accessing the Read Tree of
T 3. Thanks to the optimized read operation, T 3 does not run
into synchronization bugs since there is no memory region that
could be simultaneously written to by more than one thread. In
particular, each thread shares the position map but only reads
from the position map. Each thread contains its own stash
memory which is written to separately by each thread.
Claim 6. The memory interactions within the enclave are
side-channel-resistant. The design of T 3 incorporates de-
fenses against the side-channel threats [51], [31], [32] plaguing
Intel SGX. In particular, we used ORAM operations to hide all
data access patterns on the untrusted memory region, and we
incorporated similar oblivious operation techniques introduced
in [40], [10], [42] to prevent operations inside the enclave
from leaking sensitive information. Finally, the implementation
of T 3 is also secure against branch-prediction attacks since
each individual operation (e.g., accessing Read Tree, updating
Write Tree etc.) takes the same sequence of branches and
therefore reveals no information to the attacker, from the
accessed branches.
B. Denial of Service Attacks from Malicious Clients
While the design of T 3 is pratical, a malicious client can
still incur a large processing time on the server by creating
lots of addresses and sending large number of requests for
those requests. One way to mitigate such attack is to apply
fees on users of the service. Another approach to mitigate
denial of service attack is to use a cuckoo filter [24] to load all
addresses from the UTXO set. Upon receiving requests from
client, the managing enclave can verify if the address matches
the filter as well as the proof of ownership of that address
before performing ORAM accesses. Moreover, since Cuckoo
filter data structure supports deletion operation, the system can
add and remove addresses when performs updating. In other
word, in order to perform the denial of service attack, clients
need both the proof of ownership as well as a certain amount
of Bitcoin in each address. Hence, it will cost more for the
client to perform such attack.
C. Other Goals Achieved by T 3
In this subsection, in addition to the Privacy goal describe
in section VI-A, we explain how T 3 achieves the other goals
mentioned in subsection II-B.
Validity. Under the assumption that the adversary does not
have enough computational power to form a new Bitcoin block,
the system will only obtain valid transaction by verifying the
Merkle root and the proof of work of the Bitcoin block.
Completeness. By offering different ways of mapping be-
tween Bitcoin addresses and ORAM block id, we can offer
services to 92−96% of all clients with some trade-off between
storage overhead and performance.
Efficiency. Our contribution to efficiency is threefold. First,
our system is able to handle bursty requests from client
concurrently. The core idea is to separate the effect of a stan-
dard ORAM access into different enclaves. Thus, the multiple
reading enclave can concurrently perform read operations at
the same time that the writing enclave can perform a non-
blocking Evict procedure on the other tree. Second, by having
two ORAM trees, we minimize the downtime of the system by
having the writing enclave performed updates on one tree and
reading enclave handled clients’ requests on the other tree. The
server downtime depends on the number of requests that the
system receives when the writing enclave performs ORAM
updates on the original ORAM tree. Finally, by enforcing
clients to provide the proof of ownership of the address and
assuming that a honest client is rational, we prevent other
clients from querying addresses that do not belong to them.
VII. RELATED WORK
General SGX Systems. Haven [12] is a pioneering work
on SGX computing enabling native application SGX porting
on windows. Graphene [15] provides a linux-based LibOS for
SGX programs. Ryoan [29] retrofits Native Client to provide
sandboxing mechanisms for Intel SGX. Eleos [38] provides a
user-space extension of enclave memory using custom encryp-
tion. T 3 uses some concepts from Eleos especially in the way
we store the ORAM tree using custom encryption outside the
SGX enclave.
SGX Side-channels. There are three main memory-
based side-channel vulnerabilities disclosed within Intel
SGX, namely, page table-based attacks [51], cache-based at-
tacks [13], and branch-prediction attacks [31]. Furthermore,
since SGX relies on the untrusted OS for system-call handling,
it is also vulnerable to IAGO attacks [16]. Leaky Cauldron [48]
presents an overview of the possible attack vectors against
SGX programs. T 3 is secure against all disclosed memory-
based side-channels since it uses oblivious RAM (ORAM)
to protect the access-patterns. Furthermore, T 3 uses oblivious
memory primitives to secure the runtime ORAM operations as
well as its library.
Oblivious Systems. Raccoon [40] provided a technique to
protect a small part of a user program against all digital
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side-channels. OBLIVIATE [10] and ZEROTRACE [42] used
ORAM-based operations to protect files and data arrays re-
spectively inside Intel SGX. Thang Hoang et al. [28] proposed
a combination of TEE and ORAM to design oblivious search
and update platform for large dataset. Eskandarian et a. [23]
leveraged Intel SGX and Path ORAM to propose oblivious
SQL database management system.
Recently, Chakraborti et al. proposed a new parallel ORAM
scheme called ConcurORAM [14]. Similar to the T 3 de-
sign, ConcurORAM also uses two-tree structure to propose a
non-blocking eviction procedure, and the system periodically
synchronizes two trees to maintain the privacy of the user’s
access pattern. In ConcurORAM, the scheme requires the
client to download the query log and the result log to learn
about ongoing queries before requesting ORAM accesses.
Hence, if we combine ConcurORAM along with Intel SGX to
design this system, the use of query and result logs introduces
additional storage overhead to the limited storage capacity
of the Intel SGX. More importantly, the author also noted
that ConcurORAM cannot be trivially extended to a recursive
ORAM construction because of concurrent data structure ac-
cesses. However, if ConcurORAM can be implemented into a
recursive ORAM construction, we believe that ConcurORAM
can be an interesting alternate solution for the ORAM scheme
used in the design of T 3.
Another interesting parallel ORAM construction is Tao-
Store [41]. TaoStore assumes a trusted proxy that handles
concurrent client’s requests, and the proxy runs a scheduler to
make sure that there are no conflicting queries while preventing
no information leakage. However, similar to ConcurORAM,
the implementation of TaoStore is limited to the non-recursive
construction of Path ORAM which is not suitable when
combining with TEE with limited trusted memory capacity.
This work aims to design a simpler design that is suitable for
any flavor of tree-based ORAM schemes.
TEE for cryptocurrencies. The research community has
investigated different ways of combining TEE with blockchain
to both improve privacy and scalability of blockchains. Ob-
scuro [46] is a Bitcoin transaction mixer implemented in Intel
SGX that addresses the linkability issue of Bitcoin transac-
tions. Teechan [33] is an off-chain payment micropayment
channel that harnesses TEE to increase transaction throughput
of Bitcoin. Bentov et al. proposed a new design that uses Intel
SGX to build a real-time cryptocurrency exchange. Another
example is the Towncrier system [52] that uses TEE for
securely transferring data to smart contract. Another promi-
nent example is Ekiden [17] which proposed off-chain smart
contract execution using TEE. Finally, ZLite [50] system is
another example which used ORAM and TEE to provide SPV
clients with oblivious access. However, similar to BITE, ZLite
employed non-recursive PATH-ORAM as it is, and thus, the
scalability and efficiency of the system is inherently limited
due to the non-concurrent accesses.
Osuntokun et al. [39] recently present a new proposal for
Bitcoin SPV clients. This proposal is the building block for
systems like Neutrino. In particular, each block will have
its own Bloom filter. The SPV client first fetches the filter
from the full client and decides to download the block from
another client if transactions of interested are in the block. This
approach, however, introduces an additional communication
overhead to the client. In particular, a client with lots of trans-
actions scattered among different blocks needs to download
lots of full blocks, and performing verification of block can be
expensive for the resource-constrained client. This approach
does not necessarily provide more privacy for the SPV client
as the full client still learn the block that the addresses belong
to.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a system design that supports
a large-scale oblivious search on unspent transaction outputs
for Bitcoin SPV clients while efficiently maintains the state
of the Bitcoin UTXO set via an oblivious update protocol.
Our design leverages the TEE capabilities of Intel SGX to
provide strong privacy and security guarantees to Bitcoin
SPV client even with the presence of a potentially malicious
server. Moreover, by putting reasonable assumptions on the
accessing frequency of the SPV clients, we present novel
ORAM construction that offers both privacy and efficiency to
the clients. We showed that the prototype of the system is much
more efficient than the use of standard ORAM construction
as it is. In particular, due to the use of two ORAM trees in
the design of T 3, we improve the performance of an ORAM
access by two time and allow the system to handle concurrent
client’s requests. Also, our implementation shows one order
of magnitude performance gain when combining recursive
ORAM construction the current existing construction to stress
the importance of using recursive ORAM construction in TEE
with restricted memory. Finally, while the applicability of T 3
in cryptocurrencies beyond Bitcoin is apparent, we believe our
work will motivate further research on oblivious memory with
the restricted access patterns.
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